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 The Absence of the Left-Wing in Irish Politics:  
A European Anomaly1 
 
Nick Strasser 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The conventional wisdom regarding party politics among western nations has 
always been relatively simple: one from the left and one from the right, with a sprinkling 
of other parties from across the political spectrum with limited influence.  Western 
European politics is generally a competition between a center-right party or alliance and a 
center-left party or coalition.  However, Irish politics is somewhat of an anomaly 
compared to the rest of European politics in that there is an absence of a strong left-wing 
party.   
The questions that I will attempt to answer in the following pages is why Ireland 
has not fit the traditional European party model and what circumstances have made the 
Irish left unable to play a significant role in Irish politics.  In examining the absence of 
the left in Irish politics, I will focus on the Labour Party and the reasons for its inability 
to compete with Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael, Ireland’s two dominant center-right parties.  
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Professor Howard Whitcomb for his help and advice.  This paper 
relies on parliamentary data through the 1997 election and the election of the 28th Daíl.  
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Specifically, I will address the following issues as they relate to Labour’s failure: 
Labour’s stance on the national question, the presence of the Catholic Church in Irish 
politics, the absence of a strong industrial base in Ireland, the populist stances of Fianna 
Faíl, and Labour’s recent position change regarding to the European Union and free 
trade. 
The European Political Party Model 
The political parties of Europe adhering to the center-right versus center-left 
model are organized differently according to national contexts, but the two main 
groupings in Europe are the socialists and the conservatives.2  Socialist parties, which 
represent the center-left portion of the center-right versus center-left model, have 
emerged in nearly all Western European countries: the Social Democrats in Germany, 
Socialists in France and Italy, and Labour in Britain to give a few examples.  Despite 
national differences, these parties all experience a certain amount of unity given their 
adherence to a similar social democratic political ideology.  The unity that exists among 
socialist parties in Western Europe is unlike the varying conservative dogma of center-
right parties.  The Christian Democratic model that puts Catholicism at the center of the 
party’s conservative ideology is successful in Germany and Italy, but unsuccessful in 
France and absent in the UK. (Gaffney, p. 8)  The Conservative Party in the United 
Kingdom derives its ideology strictly from economic issues.  While one would expect 
Christian Democratic model to be successful in France with Catholicism being the 
predominate religion, the Gaullists have favored French nationalism over religion as the 
                                                 
2 Communist parties are reasonably strong in a few countries, most notably in Italy and France.  
However, their strength has always been limited to coalition governments, as occurred in the early 1980’s 
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source for their ideology.  The one issue that does tie the conservative parties together is 
dislike of intervention in economic matters by the state. 
However, while the center-right versus center-left model applies in most of 
Western Europe, the model does not accurately describe the Irish political party system. 
                                                                                                                                                 
in France, and for the most part are an afterthought when looking at the political landscape of Western 
Europe. 
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Since Ireland’s inception as a state, two center-right “catch-all” parties, Fianna Faíl and 
Fine Gael, have competed for power with very little competition from Labour, the very 
weak left-of-center party. (Holmes, p. 191)  Some have described the Irish political 
system as having two and a half parties, the two being Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael, with 
Labour occupying the half position.  Not only is the absence of a strong socialist party 
unusual, but classifying Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael in terms of center-right party structure 
becomes difficult as well.  Neither party fits any of the models of center-right parties with 
a distinct ideological underpinning for their conservatism.  Rather, both Fine Gael and 
Fianna Faíl each take on all of the characteristics of the center-right parties of Western 
Europe: religion, economic liberalism, and nationalism.  In the European Union party 
structure, Fine Gael associates with the Christian Democratic group in the European 
Union, while Fianna Faíl joins with the Gaullists in the European Progressive group, 
though Fianna Faíl would be as equally comfortable in the Christian Democratic group. 
(Holmes, pp. 194-5)  The seemingly random grouping of Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael 
among European center-right parties reiterates their position as “catch all parties” and 
raises the question of why Labour has been unable to compete, given that Fianna Faíl and 
Fine Gael appear to be so close ideologically. 
While Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael are difficult to put into the European model, the 
Labour Party is clearly in the same classification of the other center-left parties of 
Ireland, belonging to the socialist grouping in the European Union.  The situation in 
Ireland is unique that two center-right parties with nearly the same ideology have been 
able to hold on to power with extremely limited competition from center-left parties.  
According to Peter Mair, “In the 1980’s and 90’s, the Irish left (the Labour Party, the 
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Worker’s Party, and Democratic Left) polled an average of 14 percent of the vote, as 
against an average of more than 40 percent in the other west European countries” (Mair, 
p. 29).  Mair also notes that the Irish left’s 14 percent of the vote placed it last in relation 
to the performance of the left in other Western European countries; Switzerland is ranked 
next to last, but even so the number of votes the Swiss left received was double that of 
Ireland’s (Mair, p. 129).  In looking at Irish history, society, and political traditions, it 
becomes clearer exactly why such a political anomaly exists in Eire. 
 
Irish Political System 
In order to understand the political party environment of Ireland, it is first 
important to understand the Irish political system.  The Irish Prime Minister, the 
Taoiseach, is chosen by the majority party or coalition in the Daíl, the lower house of the 
Irish parliament, where a vast majority of the government’s power is located.  The 
members of the executive cabinet come from the ruling party or coalition in the Daíl.  
The upper house of the Irish parliament, the Seanad Éireann, is like the British House of 
Lords in that it is a deliberative body with little power.  Seanad elections are held a few 
months after the Daíl’s elections, and membership in the Seanad is chosen in large part 
from corporatist panels with the intention of providing representation for interest groups.3   
An important part of the Irish political process is the unique method in which 
officials are selected to the Daíl.  Ireland uses a system of proportional representation 
with a single transferable vote (PR-STV) in which voters rank their choice for 
                                                 
3 Gallagher includes an excellent discussion of the Irish Seanad on pp. 198-200 of his article. 
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candidates.4  Unlike the traditional “winner take all system” used in Britain, which 
facilitates a two party system, the system of proportional representation allows the 
possibility of small parties gaining seats in the Daíl, an outcome which has happened 
increasingly in recent years.  PR-STV allows voters to rank their choices for office.  Once 
a candidate receives the number of votes required to receive a seat, any more votes for 
him or her go to the next candidate indicated on the ballot.  For a candidate who finishes 
last among those on the ballot on a given count, his or her votes are taken away and 
passed to the next indicated candidate on the voter’s ballot.  PR-STV has contributed to 
the large number of parties that hold seats in the Daíl.  As Giovanni Sartori notes, “PR 
formulas facilitate multi-partyism and are, conversely, hardly conducive to two-
partyism.” (As cited in Sinnot, p. 115)  Eight parties held seats in the Daíl following the 
1997 election with six seats going to independents.  In determining the relative strength 
of the parties, looking at the first preference vote statistics are excellent ways of weighing 
the relative strength of the various parties even though the measure does not necessarily 
represent how seats are distributed in the Daíl.     
 
Irish Political Parties 
 Though it only ranks third in status and power among Irish political parties, the 
Labour Party was actually the first party to organize in Ireland.  The party was first 
conceived in 1912 by the Irish Trades Union Congress and was formally founded in 
1922.  It was committed to “a moderate policy of defense of worker’s rights,” but was 
unable to compete with Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. (Coakley, “The Foundations of 
                                                 
4 Sinnot includes an excellent discussion of the PR-STV system on pp. 115-17 of his article. 
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Statehood,” p. 22)  The party lost a significant amount of its support due to its inability to 
engage the question of Northern Ireland’s partition and has maintained the role of the 
weak third party since the inception of the Irish Free State.  The continued weakness of 
the Labour Party stems from the absence of industry and strong trade unions in Ireland, 
the anti-socialist views of the Irish Catholic Church, and Fianna Faíl’s ability to attract 
Labour’s core constituency.  Labour’s weakness demonstrates the unique position of the 
Irish left relative to the left of the rest of Europe.   
Sinn Fein, the major player in the politics of early Ireland, was formed from a 
nationalist base in 1917 headed by a leader of the Easter Uprising and a giant of Irish 
politics, Eamon de Valera. (Coakley, “The Foundations of Statehood,” p. 14)  However, 
after the ratification of the treaty with Britain that partitioned the country in 1922, leaving 
Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom, Sinn Fein split, causing a civil war 
between pro- and anti-treaty factions.  The split of Sinn Fein evolved into Fianna Faíl, 
composed of the anti-treaty forces, and Fine Gael, which represented the pro-treaty 
forces.  Fianna Faíl under the leadership of de Valera turned into the dominant party of 
Irish politics and is the majority party to this day.  Fine Gael developed as a coalition 
among Cumman na nGaedheal (the pro-Treaty wing of Sinn Fein), the Blueshirts (the 
Irish fascist movement of the 1920's), and a minor party, the National Centre Party. 
(Coakley, “The Foundations of Statehood,” p. 21)  Fine Gael quickly came to occupy the 
second position of Irish politics behind Fianna Faíl.  Labour became Ireland’s small 
center-left party, unable to compete with Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael.   
Though Fine Gael and Fianna Faíl evolved differently, the two parties are 
ideologically center-right parties.  Both parties owe their existence more to the history of 
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Ireland than to policy disagreements.  According to the logic of the center-right versus 
center-left model, one party should be able to represent the right of center ideology.  
However, both Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael have been able to maintain a stranglehold on 
Irish politics with little competition from Labour, the strongest representative of the left. 
 Peter Mair describes three major events in discussing the evolution of the Irish 
political party system.  First was Fianna Faíl’s decision to belatedly accept the treaty in 
1927 and take their seats in the Daíl.  Its action changed the nature of the pro- and anti-
treaty battle, making the contest purely political and no longer fought as a civil war 
(Mair, p. 144).  The second important event that Mair describes occurred in 1948 when 
Labour and Fine Gael chose more social democratic policies that led to Fianna Faíl 
claiming the mantle of “the national interest.” (Mair, p. 144)  With Fianna Faíl the party 
of “the national interest,” the political situation would pit Fianna Faíl against a Fine 
Gael/Labour Party coalition, a situation that would continue until 1989.  Mair’s third 
important event occurred in 1989, when Fianna Faíl entered into a coalition with a fellow 
center-right party, the Progressive Democrats.  This marked the first time that Fianna Faíl 
had entered into a coalition.  Since 1989, no party has held sole control of the Daíl, and it 
appears that coalition governments will be ruling Ireland in the future. 
 Labour participated in coalition governments with Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael 
between 1992 and 1997.  Labour began the coalition with Fianna Faíl in 1992 with 
Fianna Faíl's Albert Reynolds as Taoiseach.  Labour dissolved the coalition in 1993 due 
to policy differences with Fianna Faíl and formed a coalition with Fine Gael, making 
John Bruton of Fine Gael Taoiseach.  The coalition change is significant because it is the 
first time in Irish history that a new coalition formed without an intervening election.  
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The increasing involvement of the smaller parties in the Daíl and the declining strength of 
Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael made such an event possible.   
 
The National Question 
 The controversy that has defined Ireland since the inception of the Irish Free State 
has been the “national question”: whether or not to accept the treaty with Britain that 
partitioned Northern Ireland from the Free State.  The treaty was approved in 1921 and 
the formal transfer of power occurred in 1922.  The party that would evolve into Fianna 
Faíl was against the treaty, the party that would become Fine Gael was in favor of the 
treaty, and Labour was unable to make a significant contribution to the issue.  As the 
most important issue in Irish politics was being discussed, Labour sat on the sidelines as 
it later would during the Troubles in 1968 and during the negotiation of the Good Friday 
Agreement in 1998. 
 As a party dedicated to the rights of workers, Labour has refused to play a role in 
the nationalist question.  Instead, the party viewed the national questions as an issue that 
had little to do with “matters of immediate concern to its working class constituency.” 
(Mair, p. 133)  Parties to the left of center traditionally view issues on a class basis and 
not on a nationalist basis; they see the world with a socio-economic view instead of from 
a nationalistic perspective.  However, the national question was the single most important 
issue at the start of the Irish Free State.  A party that did not address the question of 
Northern Ireland could not compete, and this has pushed Labour into the second tier of 
Irish politics. (Mair, p. 133)  Labour’s inability to speak in terms of the nationalist 
argument pushed its constituency to embrace the nationalist rhetoric of Eamon de Valera 
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and Fianna Faíl.  According to Michael Gallagher, “For as long as Ireland is politically 
divided Fianna Faíl will have something to stand for, a cause far more inspiring than 
either of the other main parties can offer, and will continue to win votes which in other 
circumstances would go to Labour.” (Allen, p. 8)  This point is remarkable when looking 
at the election statistics: Fianna Faíl has never received less than 40 percent of the skilled 
and unskilled working classes, Labour’s core constituency. (Allen, p. 2) 
 
Labour and the Catholic Church 
 A significant hindrance to the development of the Labour Party has been the 
strong presence of the Catholic Church in Ireland.  John Coakley notes that “nationalist 
and Catholic elements in Irish culture encourage a conservative outlook.” (Holmes, p. 
193)   Nearly all the center-left parties in Europe have embraced socialism in some form.  
However, the Catholic Church’s adverse opinion of socialism combined with the political 
strength of the Church in Ireland prevented socialism from ever leaving the realm of the 
political taboo.  The inability of the Labour Party to actively embrace at least some mild 
socialist principles has prevented the party from ever breaking free of the mold of Irish 
political parties.  The seemingly paradoxical relationship between socialism and Catholic 
nationalism played a large role in preventing the Labour Party’s success. 
 The Catholic Church in Ireland plays a strong role in all aspects of Irish life, and 
political life is no exception.  According to Jean Blanchard, author of The Church in 
Contemporary Ireland, “The Bishops of Ireland appear to have more power, in practice, 
than those of any other country in the world.  As the natural outcome of a long historical 
tradition…a member of the congregation listens more readily to his Bishop than he does, 
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for instance, to his deputy.” (As quoted in Chubb, p. 101)  The political clout of the 
Catholic Church is extremely visible within Labour Party itself.  As a Labour Party leader 
stated in 1953, “I am an Irishman second; I am a Catholic first.…If the Hierarchy gives 
me any direction with regard to Catholic social teaching or Catholic moral teaching, I 
accept without qualification in all respects the teaching of…the Church to which I 
belong.” (Chubb, p. 103)  Given such strong religious sentiment, it is not surprising that 
the Labour Party, with pressure from the Church, removed the phrase “Worker’s 
Republic” from the party constitution in 1939. (Chubb, p. 101)  The willingness of the 
Labour Party to bend to the will of the Church demonstrates the Church’s political power.   
 A schism within the Labour Party in 1944 clearly indicates the problem that the 
party had with the double standard of adhering to the principles of the party without 
going too far to the left and alienating the Church.  The Labour Party split into two 
factions, with one retaining the same name and another calling itself the National Labour 
Party (NLP).  The cause of the split was whether to allow a former Irish Communist 
Party member, Jim Larkin, to run for a seat in the Dáil. (Allen, p. 79)  The ITGWU (Irish 
Transport and General Workers Union), Ireland’s largest trade union, left the Labour 
Party to form the NLP on grounds that the Labour Party had permitted communist 
influences to infiltrate the party and that the party would be unable to ever recover. 
(Allen, p. 79)  Afraid to be accused of embracing communist elements, Labour responded 
to the NLP’s splintering by ordering a McCarthy-style purging of the party.  Rather than 
remain true to the mild socialist principles of the party’s doctrine, the Labour Party tried 
to match the level of the NLP’s “Catholic nationalism,” which included the expulsion of 
six party members (Allen, p. 80)  
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The NLP and the Labour Party would reconcile eventually in 1950, but Labour’s 
inability to maintain a coherent message in the face of fear of reprisals from the Catholic 
Church and its supporters underscores the fine line that Labour had to walk between 
leftist ideology and Irish nationalism.  The strength of the Church pushed the party far 
enough to the right that it was in many ways indistinguishable from the center-right 
parties.  It is possible that a stronger embrace of socialism would have never been popular 
in Ireland, but it is also clear that the Labour Party’s bland version of Irish socialism 
never became very popular either. 
However, in recent years the political power of the Catholic Church has been in 
decline as exemplified by more open debates regarding birth control and abortion.  The 
decline in political power of the Church and its conservative view of social policy could 
allow the parties of the left to procure more support than they could previously. 
 
Labour’s Working Class Constituency 
 As is the case of nearly all center-left parties, the Labour Party depends on the 
support of labor unions for its success.  However, Ireland’s predominately agrarian 
economy made that constituency very small.  The Labour Party completely dedicated 
itself to industrial related issues which did not result in a constituency large enough for a 
significant political base.  The number of people in Ireland involved in non-agrarian 
pursuits did not even rise above 50 percent until the late 1950’s. (Coakley, “Society and 
Political Culture,” p. 38)  In order to achieve political success, Labour needed to attract a 
constituency larger than just the industrial working class.  Its failure to produce a broader 
membership contributed to its inability to compete with Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael. 
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However, not only is Labour’s core constituency small, but Fianna Fail has 
always targeted and won a significant portion of the working class vote total.  When 
Eamon de Valera formed Fianna Faíl in 1926 from a split within Sinn Fein, he 
specifically targeted the poor and disenfranchised of the industrial class.  He was no 
longer only interested in only exploiting Fianna Fail’s success with the national question; 
he was now inclined to form a populist base with both economic and nationalistic 
grounds.  He said that he wanted Fianna Faíl to “take an effective part in improving the 
social and material conditions of the people.” (Allen, p. 15)  He would achieve this aim 
by appealing to the nationalistic urges of Labour’s core constituency, the working class.  
Labour made the traditional center-left argument that Irish poverty was a by-product of 
the capitalist system and that the wealthy were to blame for the plight of the poor.  
However, de Valera made the much more exciting nationalist argument that the wealthy 
were not to blame for Ireland’s poor; it was instead the British who were the culprits. 
 Looking away from the economic model put forward by Labour, de Valera 
wanted what he described as a “a program for the national good, not a class programme.” 
(Allen, p. 18)  He needed to get away from potential class cleavages in order to steal 
Labour’s support.  He argued that the British were the cause of Irish poverty, and he 
stated that he wanted a program of developing Irish industries “that minister to the needs 
of the people and…protect them by adequate tariffs.” (Allen, p.16)  The nationalistic 
argument was exactly what the impoverished Irish wanted to hear, and de Valera’s 
resulting success was considerable.  Fianna Faíl has never taken less than 40 percent of 
the working class vote, and Fianna Faíl would be the dominant party in Irish politics for 
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the next seventy years.  The result of Fianna Faíl’s success among the working class 
helped prevent any future success of Labour. 
 
Irish Politics in the Last Twenty Years  
 In the last twenty years, the diminishing power of the two main parties, Fianna 
Faíl and Fine Gael, has changed the landscape of Irish parties.  Since the middle 1960’s, 
the two major parties would consistently get a combined share of more than 80 percent of 
the total first preference votes.  However, that percentage has consistently declined 
through the 1980’s, and the combined vote total for Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael was 63.6 
percent in 1992 and 67.2 percent in 1997. (Coakley and Gallagher, Appendix 2)  
 The result of the fall of the vote shares of Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael has not been 
a rise in Labour’s vote share (with the exception of 1992), but rather an increase in the 
vote share of small parties such as the Progressive Democrats, the Democratic Left, and 
Sinn Fein.  The decline of Fianna Faíl’s vote share has also precipitated a movement 
towards coalition governments, as demonstrated in all of the governments of the 1990’s.  
The results of the 1989 election pushed Fianna Faíl into a coalition with the Progressive 
Democrats.  Fianna Faíl also formed a coalition in with Labour in 1992 which lasted until 
1993 when Labour dissolved the coalition and entered into a government with Fine Gael, 
a coalition that stayed together until the 1997 election.  Following the 1997 election, 
Fianna Fail entered into a coalition with the Progressive Democrats. 
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Present Problems for the Labour Party 
Given Ireland’s recent economic advancement, nearly all political parties, with 
the notable exception of Sinn Fein, have rushed to embrace free trade and involvement 
with the European Union.  The structural funds that the European Union has sent to Eire 
as well as the foreign direct investment that membership in the EU has brought make it 
very difficult for the Labour Party to make an anti-free trade argument as it did for so 
many years.  The economic success that Ireland has experienced makes criticizing 
economic policy very difficult.  Labour’s old position had been that both membership in 
the EU and free trade hurt the Irish worker, but that position is difficult to maintain when 
the unemployment rate has reached an all-time low and the GDP continues to grow.  As a 
result of Ireland’s economic growth, Labour’s economic policy has become identical to 
that of Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael.  Labour’s platform had always been a solely economic 
one; and now that that its platform is identical to those of the other parties with respect to 
trade and EU policy, a decline in Labour’s standing has resulted since the 1992 election. 
 However, in 1992 Labour had gained more seats in the Daíl than ever before and 
had received more than double its first preference vote total compared to 1989. (Mair, p. 
147)   Labour’s strongest showing since 1922 had given the party 33 seats in the Daíl, 
and the party then joined with Fine Gael to form the coalition government. (Nealon, 
1993, p. 6)  However, Labour’s success would not continue.  The party had a dismal 
showing only five years later in the 1997 election when it only secured 17 seats in the 
Daíl. (Nealon, 1997, p. 6)  Labour’s decline could be attributed to the platform changes 
that it made between 1992 and 1997.   
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 The resignation of Labour Party head Dick Spring, the deputy Taoiseach under 
the coalition governments between 1992 and 1997, has left the Labour Party with no 
clear leadership.  Spring was by all accounts a skillful leader and was a big reason for the 
Labour Party’s success in 1992.  His absence has caused problems for Labour since the 
1997 election.   
 However, Labour’s performance in the next election may be improved by its 
absorbing the Democratic Left (DL), a party to the left of Labour which had strong 
representation among Dublin’s blue-collar workers.  (Holmes, p. 192)  The merger 
formally took place in January of 1999 and should assist the Labour Party in surpassing 
its 1997 performance in the 2001 elections.  Assuming that nearly all of the Democratic 
Left’s supporters will support the combined Labour-Democratic Left party, the merger 
would give Labour roughly 2.5 percent more of the first preference votes and about four 
more seats in the Daíl. (Nealon, 1997, p. 6)   
 
Will There Be a New Representative of the Left? 
 With Labour’s abandonment of its traditionally pro-worker stances, Sinn Fein 
remains the only anti-Europe and anti-free-trade party in Ireland.  A significant number 
of unskilled workers who used to work in labor-intensive areas are unable to find 
employment in Ireland’s new technology-based economy.  These unemployed workers 
have traditionally looked to Labour to defend their interests, but Labour’s support among 
such constituents is declining with the movement of Labour to a pro-EU, pro free-trade 
platform.  Thanks to Labour’s switch, some of these disenfranchised voters voted for 
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Sinn Fein, as demonstrated by its gaining a seat in 1997 compared to having no seats in 
1992. (Nealon, 1997, p. 6 and Nealon, 1993, p. 6)   
The success of Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael is assured for as long as Ireland’s 
economy continues to grow.  However, if the economy should ever worsen, Labour and 
possibly some other parties as well may change their stances on the EU and free trade.  
Sinn Fein would have the most to gain from any economic downturn because they will be 
able to blame Irish trade policy for the decline.  If Sinn Fein softens its nationalist 
rhetoric, it is not inconceivable that it could pick up a few more seats in the next election 
and continue to erode Labour’s traditional position of representative of the working class.  
Of course, Sinn Fein’s giving up its nationalist rhetoric would be a major departure from 
the established platform of the party; but if it did alter its position even moderately, the 
political dividends could be significant.  The move of Labour to the middle creates a 
vacuum on the left, however small it may be in Irish politics; Sinn Fein could move into 
it, thus altering the Irish political landscape.   
 
Conclusion 
The basic reason that Ireland’s political party structure does not look like that of 
the rest of Western Europe is that the Irish experience in the development of political 
institutions is much different.  Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael each owe their origins and their 
subsequent success to the conflict over the national question.  However, on the reverse 
side, Labour can trace its lack of success to its inability to address the “national question” 
adequately.  Labour’s continued failure can also be attributed to Ireland’s conservative 
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social environment and Labour’s attractiveness to only a small portion of the Irish 
population.   
However, with the recent political and social changes in Ireland, the prospects for 
the Irish left may be getting better.  The strength of the Catholic Church is diminishing, 
as is the stranglehold of Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael on the Irish electorate.  But the parties 
of the Irish left must avoid moving too far to the middle where they would be swallowed 
up by Fianna Faíl and Fine Gael.  The opportunity for the success of the Irish left exists 
only if it can provide a clear alternative to the policies of the two major Irish political 
parties. 
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Abstract 
The political party systems of nearly all Western European countries consist of a 
center-right party against a center-left party.  However, in Ireland two center-right parties 
compete for power with very little competition from any parties left of center.  In this 
article the author explains why the Irish left has been so weak in the past and what its 
prospects are for the future. 
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